for differing national or sectoral rates of participation in international agreements. It is critical that analysts and policymakers understand the potential costs of allowing incomplete participation. Are these costs large or small? This is the question to which the present study is addressed.
The standard approach to modeling differential participation is to disaggregate to the level of the decision makers, in this case primarily to the country level. This approach is demanding, for it requires accurately estimated national cost functions, 5 which in turn require the use of energy and economic models with accurate data at the national scale for at least the major countries over several decades. This approach is also demanding computationally, because it requires, in principle, solving an intertemporal general equilibrium economic model with trade and capital accumulation.
The present study presents a simplified approach that will allow an easy calculation of the costs of nonparticipation. The approach is to introduce a "participation function," a functional representation of the cost of partial participation. This approach assumes that a subset of countries will reduce emissions in a harmonized fashion while the rest undertake no emissions reductions. I will show that using a well-defined but general functional form, ones that can be introduced into global integrated assessment models, one can derive an exact mathematical representation of the result of incomplete participation. This new specification allows for estimates of the impact of alternative groupings of participating nations, such as the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol or its extensions, under alternative regimes such as those with harmonized carbon taxes.
The approach in this study is aimed at showing the basic role of participation in an existing simplified integrated assessment model, namely, the DICE model (Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy). 6 Such an approach clearly cannot capture all the complexities of a full model with many countries engaged in international trade. Rather, the point is to show how the general impact of partial participation can be estimated and understood in an aggregate model. Clearly, a full model, one that includes trade, leakages, imperfect competition, tariffs and nontariff barriers, and other elements, would be desirable, were it feasible. However, the present approach has the advantage that the effects of nonparticipation can be understood intuitively. The important qualifications of an aggregate approach are discussed further below.
I. Analytical Background
The approach begins by assuming a specific mathematical form for the cost of abatement of greenhouse gases, or CO 2 in this specific estimate. Assuming a specific form is similar to assuming a Cobb-Douglas or nested CES (constant elasticity of substitution) production function in an econometric model of production or demand.
The DICE model has developed a specific reduced-form abatement cost function, which has been used in several vintages of the model. It has been tested and calibrated by comparison with both larger econometric models and activity analysis models and has been found relatively accurate. 7 In the case of 100 percent participation, the cost function is the following:
(1) 
C(t) = Q(t) (t) (t)
where Q P (t) is the output of the participating countries. The overall control rate is given by
Substituting, and recalling that Q P (t) = Q(t)π(t), one gets
Equation 5 is the participation cost function, which shows how costs are affected by incomplete participation. This equation may be compared with the complete-participation abatement cost function in equation 1. With incomplete participation, abatement costs for a given global control rate rise by the costpenalty factor 1-β (t) π .
Nonparticipation thus induces an inefficiency, which is an exponential function of the parameter (β -1), which in turn represents the convexity of the marginal cost of abatement function. If marginal costs are constant, then (β -1) is zero, and there is no penalty from incomplete participation. On the other hand, if marginal costs rise with abatement (as is found in virtually all studies), then (β -1) > 0 and incomplete participation is costly; if, in addition, the marginal cost function is convex (as is suggested by most empirical cost studies), then the cost accelerates as participation declines. 8
II. Empirical Estimation
Estimates of the participation function depend upon the shape of the abatement cost function in equation 5. The DICE model uses a reduced-form cost function, as noted above. This is derived by estimating the marginal cost of emissions reduction as a function of the emissions control rate for different detailed models of abatement costs. In building the DICE model over several vintages, we have examined several studies of the cost of emissions reductions. The common feature of virtually all of them is that the crucial parameter, (β -1), is substantially larger than zero. This indicates that the cost function is highly convex. Table 1 , also from the IPCC, summarizes the results. Both Figure 1 and Table 1 show that the cost function is highly convex.
Estimating the abatement cost functions using the results in Table 1 as pseudo-data yields the estimated coefficients in Table 2 . The estimates are around 1.8 for the bottom-up models and 2.3 for the top-down models. This difference, which has not been noted in earlier studies, suggests that the cost of incomplete participation will be higher when calculated with top-down models than with bottom-up models. I choose the parameter value 1.8 for the estimates below, because that value has also been found in comparisons with other models. 9 One can test whether these results are reasonable by using a standard production model. (These calculations are not included here but can easily be verified.) Assume, for example, that production is Cobb-Douglas in carbon inputs and other inputs; that the share coefficient (Cobb-Douglas exponent) for carbon energy is 0.1; that the existing price, including tax, of carbon inputs is $200 per ton; and consider a range of new carbon taxes from $50 to $950 per ton. Solving the model for the cost-minimizing carbon inputs and estimating equation 1 using these pseudo-data yields a coefficient of β = 3.15 (+ 0.12). This estimate is sensitive to the exact assumptions about preexisting prices, but it does indicate that the underlying model is consistent with standard production theory.
For the DICE model we use the estimates for the bottom-up model, so in the results in the next section I assume that (β -1) = 1.8. One could undertake sensitivity analyses with higher values of the elasticity, for example (β -1) = 2.3. These would produce even higher values of the inefficiencies of nonparticipation. For example, with a 50 percent participation rate, the costpenalty factor for an elasticity of 1.8 is 3.48, whereas for an elasticity of 2.3 it is 4.9. However, as noted above, the lower estimates appear consistent with a broader range of models and are relied upon here.
One major shortcoming of the present approach is that it cannot deal with issues of leakage. 10 Suppose that the cost functions shown in Figure 1 are ones that assume full participation. One might then apply those cost functions to a scenario where only high-income countries participate. One would expect that there would be some leakage -in other words, that the emissions of nonparticipants would rise because carbon-intensive production would migrate to those countries. Suppose that emissions rise by 10 percent in nonparticipating countries. Assuming that preagreement emissions and cost functions are the same in both participants and nonparticipants, this would lead to a rise of 5 percent in global emissions. The cost function would therefore be misspecified, because the cost estimated to hold with a reduction of 0.50μ(t) would in fact be the cost function for 0.45μ(t). This would lead to an underestimate of costs.
The situation is slightly more complicated than this simple example would indicate, however. First, even though leakage occurs and overall emissions reduction is overestimated, the costs of reduction may be lowered because of the leakage. The situation would be more complicated still if, as seems realistic, countervailing duties are imposed on carbon-intensive goods from nonparticipants. This would tend to reduce the leakage of tradable goods, but it would lead to other distortions that would be extremely complex to model. developing countries by authorizing projects that, in principle, induce low-cost emissions reductions in those countries. As of early 2009, the CDM had authorized certified emission reduction (CER) credits amounting to 2.7 billion metric tons of CO 2 for the 2008-2012 period, equivalent to approximately 6 percent of emissions by Annex I countries. 11 Whether these reductions are actually incremental is, however, very controversial.
III. Applications
The following three examples will illustrate how participation matters to the efficiency of a policy. Begin with the example of the Kyoto Protocol. Many integrated assessment models have found that the Kyoto Protocol is not costeffective given the low participation rate. One can see why this is the case using the participation cost function. One also can show how costs are affected by incomplete participation when the target of a global warming treaty is a temperature limitation.
What is the cost of limiting participation to Annex I countries?
Annex I countries, including the United States, accounted for about 66 percent of global CO 2 emissions in 1990. I assume that the exponent of the cost function is (β -1) = 1.8. With 66 percent participation, the cost of incomplete participation in 1990 was 
How many countries are needed for a reasonably efficient agreement?
A second application is to ask how close one can get to the global optimum with an architecture that limits the emissions controls to major countries. One can calculate the cost penalty that arises from limiting the scope of the policy to a subset of countries. Using the formula above, one can then calculate the ratio of the cost of achieving a policy with limited participation to the cost with universal participation. Table 3 lists the top 25 countries in the world as ranked by 2005 energy CO 2 emissions, and Figure 2 shows the share of global energy CO 2 emissions of the top 5 countries, the top 10 countries, and so on . The top 5 countries generate about two-thirds of total emissions, but one has to include more than the top 20 countries to reach 90 percent of emissions. Moreover, to attain that 90 percent one has to include countries that either are relatively poor (such as India or Indonesia) or are energy exporters with poor incentives to join (such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela). Note as well that the nonparticipation of either China or the United States would remove 20 percent of global emissions from participation at the very outset. Table 4 shows the results of the calculations. For this purpose, I have used constant 2005 emissions to estimate the cost of nonparticipation. For simplicity, I assume that for these groupings the shares of the large countries in global emissions are relatively stable over the next few decades as long as the large developing countries are included.
The estimates in Table 4 suggest that limiting participation to the big 5 emitters (the United States, China, the European Union, Russia, and India) would cover about two-thirds of global emissions. The cost-penalty factor would be around 2.14, which means that achieving a given climate objective would cost about twice as much (114 percent more) if the agreement were limited to these countries. At the other extreme, including all of the top 25 countries except the poorest and the energy exporters would expand the agreement to cover 80 percent of emissions; this would lead to a cost penalty of 50 percent. 13 
What are the likely costs of temperature limitation policies?
As a final example, consider a policy of limiting the rise in global temperature to 2°C over preindustrial levels. Such a policy would put particular importance on higher participation compared with policies that balance costs and benefits. For these experiments, I estimate the costs as well as other variables for three different levels of participation: 100 percent, 75 percent, and 50 percent. Seventy-five percent participation would correspond to the more ambitious participation described in the last section: the big 10 emitters. Fifty percent participation would be comparable to an expanded Kyoto Protocol including the United States. Table 5 shows the results in terms of the total discounted costs and impacts of the different programs. Because the programs aim at limiting the temperature increase to 2°C, the differences in costs are primarily discounted abatement costs. The first line in the table shows the difference in costs relative to an agreement with 100 percent participation. Limiting participation to 75 percent costs an additional $2.9 trillion in expected value, and limiting participation to 50 percent adds $10.9 trillion in expected value. In terms of total discounted abatement, the cost of meeting the 2°C objective is $3.9 trillion for 100 percent participation, $6.3 trillion for 75 percent, and $13.0 trillion for 50 percent. These represent 0.26, 0.42, and 0.86 percent, respectively, of discounted global consumption, respectively.
Another way of measuring the impact of reduced participation is in terms of the burden placed on participants. Figure 3 shows the carbon prices in the participating regions that are estimated to result under each of the three participation assumptions. (See the appendix for details of the calculation.) These implicit carbon prices are astronomical under limited participation. Indeed, it seems unlikely that they are politically or economically feasible. These results suggest that a policy of limiting the rise in global temperature to 2°C is unlikely to succeed without a participation rate close to 100 percent.
IV. Conclusions
This study has examined the economic impacts that arise when some countries do not participate in a treaty to limit global warming. It begins with the point -which has been understood for many years -that limiting participation can produce significant inefficiencies by raising the cost of reaching global targets, whether set in terms of emissions, atmospheric concentrations, or temperature change.
The contribution of the present study is to introduce a functional form for the cost function that allows a very simple way of estimating the costs of nonparticipation. The results can be understood intuitively as follows. Suppose that the world is divided into two groups of countries-participants and nonparticipants-in the manner of the Kyoto Protocol. Participants are assumed to have harmonized carbon prices (say, through emissions trading), whereas nonparticipants have a zero price of carbon emissions. Assume further for mathematical tractability that the cost function is log-linear (or a power function), although that is not critical to the results.
Under these simplifying assumptions, one can easily estimate the cost penalty associated with a regime with partial participation. That penalty is roughly equal to the inverse of the square of the participation rate. This implies, for example, that a participation rate of 50 percent has a cost-penalty factor of close to 4. (The actual cost penalty, when the cost of non-participation is proportional to participation to an inverse power of 1.8, is 3.5.)
The reason for the high cost penalty from nonparticipation is that the cost function is highly convex, with a sharply increasing marginal cost of emissions reduction as the reduction rate rises. In other words, there are substantial reductions of CO 2 available at relatively low cost (lots of low-hanging fruit), but the marginal cost of additional reductions rises steeply as the reduction rate rises. This high degree of convexity implies that sizable global reductions can be achieved inexpensively if all nations participate. Conversely, if many do not participate, the cost penalty is high, because the low-cost emissions reductions possible in the nonparticipating regions cannot be achieved. Put differently, there are low-hanging fruits all around the world, but a regime that limits participation to the high-income countries passes up the low-hanging fruit in the developing world.
All these experiments reinforce the point that, for a global public good like reducing CO 2 emissions, achieving a high level of participation is a critical feature of an efficient policy. Although this point has been understood for some time in an abstract way, the numerical results of this paper make the point in a dramatic fashion. 
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